During a routine scan of new vulnerability reports for the Exploit Database, we came across a single post in full disclosure by Martin Tschirsich, about a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in FreePBX. This vulnerability sounded intriguing, and as usual, required verification in the EDB. After a couple of emails back and forth with Martin, the path to code execution became clearer:.
We quickly whipped up a Metasploit module for this, and gave it a shot. The exploit worked out of the box for both the FreePBX and Elastix community distributions, given a known extension or username. The malicious URL actually triggers a phone call to the specific extension, and when the call is answered or goes to voicemailour payload is executed on the VOIP server.
By abusing the nmap —interactive command we can easily escalate to root privileges:. The Metasploit module should be released in the next few days. The vendor has been contacted and provided with a patch several times since Jun 12, Since no intention to address this issue was shown, I felt it was in the best interest to disclose the vulnerability.
Elastix 2.2.0 Local File Inclusion
Your browser does not support the video tag. Earn your OSWE. Kitts and Nevis.OK so now there is a tweet out there telling Foritgate users to check their stuff because of FreePBX servers getting pwned due to Fortigate exploits. Last time I check, putting a firewall rule in is not an exploit. Is it more than 2 but less than 12? More than that? Has enough data been provided that shows this is a Fortigate exploit or is it cases like this one?
They are using Fortigate but then they had a rule to allow access. Firmware updates with a patch? Are there any suggested support steps users can take? Last week I got several commercial support tickets where the customer was reporting excessive calls to high tariff destinations for toll fraud. I personally touched 3 separate systems behind 3 separate routers on 3 separate sites for 2 customers.
In all three cases, the firewall was hacked to forward untrusted traffic to the PBX from the 'net. As is customary, the local LAN subnet s were white listed so both the pbx firewall and fail2ban ignored the intrusion.
Once the above was in place, it was just a matter of brute forcing the provisioning services until they got a valid provisioning filename. The provisioning file leaked extension secrets allowing registrations of their own clients, which in turn allowed outbound calls from malicious users.
The log fingerprints were there for all to see. Looking at the published vulnerabilities for this vendor, I would suspect that there are lots of customers who should look to patching their environment sooner rather than later! This topic was automatically closed 7 days after the last reply. New replies are no longer allowed. Fortigate exploit FreePBX. I presume you refer to mine: Last week I got several commercial support tickets where the customer was reporting excessive calls to high tariff destinations for toll fraud.FYI, I would like to share these two articles hoping to encourage the community in keeping their system up to date.
In summary, attackers could use a vulnerability to access the FreePBX, steal data and install crypto mining scripts. It seems that the security hole has been patched, so it is recommended not to put off updates for long. I love articles like these. One claims there was a patch released for this vulnerability but the other has no mention of the patch. Very helpful.
The point is to encourage people to keep their systems up to date. When vulnerabilities are discovered the responsible parties are first to be informed before it is made public and they issue patches. So regardless of the affected Asterisk version, updating the software is important to mitigate any known or publicly unknown security risks. Here is the thing about these articles. So that would mean there are numerous Asterisk installs out in the world that would never be impacted by this, at all.
These articles fail to relate how this is being done.
What attack vectors are being used? Is it a buffer overflow? Is it a SQL injection? Again, ZERO information provided. The former uses PHP 5. What versions of FreePBX where these monitored systems running? Were they current boxes? Were they v13 or v14? I mean come on, look at the first article. The report is based off of reporting from Feb - July of ! Over a year and a half ago. So honestly, if you are a year and a half behind on your updates, you deserve a quick kick in the gonads to wake you up.
I included the source article for people like you to contact the researches to get more details. This could be related to this vulnerability or another one. How many of FreePBX users screen their server for crypto mining?
I know the risk is real. My aim to bring awareness to general audience to take action by updating their systems.
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And for people interested in details, the second link provide the source article with the researcher names to get more information. That is the most recent exploit but there was also one from in the long deprecated Asterisk Recordings Interface ARI. Note the date in the wiki page, it is more than 3 years old. While I suppose some organizations might be targeted for those types of activities, what we see in practice is ALWAYS traffic pumping, generating outbound calls to high cost destinations.
A good suite of security tools should include all the standard things plus a root kit tool, I use. It would detect new files appearing in standard or custom places which seems to cover the last few FPBX patches. Watching for unusual calling patterns also, many attempted attacks happen early on Sunday morning. I believe in teamwork and shared responsibility. This is why I have shared this hear to be vetted by skilled people.
The second link is an abstract in a security conference. They are usually limited to the number of characters.There were security vulnerabilities before however we have only maintained this list from forward. This includes such things as code snippets and a proof of concept if you have one. We will evaluate the report and send a non-automated response within 3 US business days.
This follow-up may request additional information and require additional time for evaluation if enough detail was not originally supplied. Once verified a private issue will be created visible only to staff and you as the reporter. The time this takes will vary greatly based on the amount of detail provided and the ultimate complexity of the issue. The goal is to verify and resolve issues as quickly as possible but there is no guaranteed amount of time. The goal for the entire process is to be at or below Google's Project Zero standard of 60 days, but we expect to be able to work with the CERT standard of 45 days from report to full public disclosure.
Once an issue has been verified and fixed an abstract public disclosure will be released. This disclosure will have the following items:. After the agreed on mitigation period has expired, the reporter may make public full details including proof of concepts and other data to various mediums.
Functional details of the exploit will not be released by us on our wiki, forums or issue tracker. Current stable, unreleased future versions, and one major release behind will receive security updates. Exploits for older versions may not be fixed.
It is recommended that users run on the latest version of FreePBX. To be eligible for bounty consideration the reporter MUST follow the guidelines above. The bounty can be paid in Bitcoin or equivalent crypto-currency if the security researcher wishes to remain anonymous. Evaluate Confluence today. Pages Blog. Page tree. Browse pages. A t tachments 0 Page History. Jira links. Created by Andrew Nagylast modified on 11 Sep Investigation and Resolution The time this takes will vary greatly based on the amount of detail provided and the ultimate complexity of the issue.
Initial Public Disclosure Once an issue has been verified and fixed an abstract public disclosure will be released. This disclosure will have the following items: Name of component affected Affected versions Fixed versions Credit to the person who discovered the issue if permitted by the researcher A CVE if available. Full Disclosure After the agreed on mitigation period has expired, the reporter may make public full details including proof of concepts and other data to various mediums.
Fixed Versions Current stable, unreleased future versions, and one major release behind will receive security updates. When possible issues will be fixed as far back as practical, but this may not be practical. No labels. Powered by Atlassian Confluence 6.Sangoma was recently made aware of a significant security vulnerability affecting the administrator web interface for current versions of FreePBX and PBXact.
We would like to publicly thank those who reported this issue to us in a responsible manner. This responsible disclosure allowed us to prepare updates and make them available before public disclosure of the vulnerability, so that FreePBX users can secure their systems.
Under what circumstances can intrusion take place, and how can FreePBX administrators tell if their system has already been had? Based on the timing, It sounds like we have fell victim to this exploit. The extension that was compromised had a random password on it that I would not have used. This was a red flag for me.
Luckily we caught the exploit before they spent too much on calls to Morroco. We had already blocked web access to the admin portal. Is there a way to have the UCP accessible and not the admin portal? If so, can someone post a link with directions? Thank you. That is correct. Do you have sensitive information that can be leaked from the UCP? Have you notice any change in passwords?
Thank you Sangoma for jumping on this right away. I can also appreciate the desire to also keep the attack methodology under wraps. I have taken a look at the Linux side of the logging: secure, messages, that sort of thing, but am wondering if an audit trail exists to tell who accessed and who was denied the login screen.
Is there a simple log file somewhere that I am missing that would show if anyone was able to access via the fault? I wrote few scripts that pulls the information from the logs. The logs get rotated and the scripts will not help with old incidents. This one will pull all IPs that accessed the server.
While we are getting a little off-topic with this post, I wanted to share my approach to the notification aspect since it was a part of the conversation here. I use this from within. The server name will get auto-populated. COM ". This topic was automatically closed 31 hours after the last reply. New replies are no longer allowed. Matthew Fredrickson. I will also have a look for any new users in the Admin Panel.
Thanks for the explanation. Can you confirm that is a correct understanding? Thanks for the quick response mattf That is very helpful to have confirmed. Thanks, Christian. If there is an unusual activity I get an email and I act on it.We have released updates for users on FreePBX versions 2. Versions 2. If these are present then your system has potentially been compromised. You should urgently remove this module via a system shell.
Then run the following command to remove all traces of it from FreePBX. There will be an error output saying that uninstallation scripts failed to run, however this is expected, and is signifying that the module was removed successfully. We have also noticed that additional Administrator users may have been created as part of a scripted attack. Remember the best practice to avoid risk is to not expose your system to the public internet. In FreePBX 12 we have implemented module signing which was a key element in identifying this issue.
In practice there are more eyes on the code in open source software than there are in closed source software, however the truth of the matter is security of any technological product is not determined by the method of distribution. We continue to make huge investments in time, energy, and infrastructure to continually improve these tools.
When security problems are found in open source software, the visibility of the code and ease of use provided by these new management tools allow diverse teams to collaborate and contribute code fixes. Bug and security fixes are often available within a matter of hours. If you find a potential bug in FreePBX you can open a ticket at issues. Or for potential security related issues, send an email to the security team at security freepbx.
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